be understood in Kants philosophy. For example, even among those who are keenly aware that in Kants philosophy logic and psychology cannot neatly be divorced from each other, some have been criticized for overpsychologizing, while others have been criticized for over-logicizing Kants account or for offering "anti-psychological" interpretations thereof. 4 My aim in this paper is not to focus on, let alone, to resolve this conflict, but to explore a particular theme that falls under the broader topic of the relation between logic and psychology. 5 One aspect of this relation is represented by Kants famous claim in the Transcendental Deduction sections of the Critique of Pure Reason that consciousness or self-consciousness 6 is a condition for the possibility of cognition of an object. This claim has been interpreted in various ways. Among the interpreters, 7 however, what has not received much attention, ness in one subject only" (as opposed to "a consciousness in general") results. 10 Although Kant himself leaves it unexplained why such indeterminacy with regard to the act of judging should result in what he calls the "subjective unity of consciousness", understanding this key idea will help us find ways to resolve some thorny problems and difficulties that have arisen in interpreting the relevant passages in Kants writings.
In the first part of the paper, I explain what Kant means by "the logical use of the understanding", why this use involves an indeterminate employment of the logical forms of judgment, and what this employment consists in. In the second part, I explain what role this use of the understanding plays in those passages in the Transcendental Deduction sections in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason in which Kant relates judgment with consciousness. In the third part, I show that the act of judging objectively involves the consciousness that a representation is a specific or determinate instance of a more general representation. Thus, I
will argue that what Kant calls "the subjective unity of consciousness" refers to that form of consciousness in which the subject is aware of an indeterminate relation of representations, that is to say, a relation in which a representation is not a specific or a determinate instance of a more general one.
I. Indeterminacy and the Logical Use of the Understanding
What Kant calls the "act of the understanding" 11 or judging by means of which cognition is attained is governed by rules. These rules determine the ways in which the understanding judges. The "Table of Judgments" in the Critique of Pure Reason lists the ways.
12 Kant claims that the Table is taken from "general" or formal logic. For Kant, however, the rules taken from general logic are only the necessary but not sufficient conditions for cognition of an object. For such cognition to be possible, the understanding must judge in accordance with rules that are taken from not merely a general but a "transcendental" logic. The two kinds of logic differ because one is more "general" than the other. In the Cri-tique of Pure Reason, Kant explains that general logic is "general" because it abstracts from all content of cognition, that is to say, it is indifferent to the question of whether the object has an empirical or a priori origin. As Kant puts it, general logic "concerns the use of the understanding without regard to the difference of objects". 13 Transcendental logic, on the other hand, is less general or more specific than general logic because it does "not abstract from all content of cognition": "it concerns the laws of the understanding and reason, but only insofar as they are related to objects a priori".
14 This implies that the "act of the understanding" as it operates merely in accordance with the rules of a general logic differs from the act of the understanding as it operates in accordance with the rules of a transcendental logic. But in what precisely does the difference consist?
For Kant, the two kinds of logic provide rules for two different ways in which the logical forms of judgment can be employed. He provides an example to clarify the difference. Take the judgment, "all bodies are divisible". This judgment has the categorical form, such that its function is "that of the relationship of the subject ["bodies"] to the predicate ["divisibility] ". But when the understanding follows the rules of a mere general logic, or in Kants words, "in regard to the merely logical use of the understanding", it is left "undetermined which of these two concepts will be given the function of the subject and which will be given that of the predicate. For one can also say: Something divisible is a body." 15 Thus, what Kant calls the "logical use of the understanding" 16 leaves it undetermined which of the two concepts will be given which function. 17 Elsewhere, instead of "the logical use of the understanding" Kant uses the phrase "the formal act of the understanding" 18 to refer to that act of the understanding through which the logical forms are employed indeterminately, that is, in such a way that the subject and the predicate concepts may, in Kants words, "interchange their logical functions". 19 So, for example, the two concepts in the judgment "the stone is hard" may inter-change their function so that one can also say "something hard is a stone". 20 It is important to note here that although one might be tempted to take the phrase "logical use" or "formal act" to signify that act of the understanding that is merely "formal", in the sense of "without content", such an interpretation would be incorrect. Kant makes it clear that "the logical use" or "the formal act" of the understanding is that which is operative even when representations derived from the senses, including empirical concepts, are combined in a consciousness. 21 Thus I agree with Longuenesse when she says that "by [logical use of the understanding] Kant meant, not the use of the understanding in logic, but the use of the understanding for empirical knowledge, […] " 22 This is confirmed by the example given in the quoted passage, "the stone is hard", which is an empirical judgment and in which the logical forms are said by Kant to be employed indeterminately. As we shall see, in the Prolegomena, Kant uses the phrase "a logical connection of perceptions" 23 to refer to that kind of relation of representations that is merely "subjectively valid", i. e., "empirical" and "contingent".
When, on the other hand, the categorical form of judgment is employed in such a way that it is determined which of the two concepts is to function as the subject and which is to function as the predicate, the understanding follows the rules of a transcendental logic, in which the logical form (the relation between the subject and predicate) becomes the category of substance and accident. Thus, when the category is employed, the two concepts in the judgment "bodies are divisible" may not "interchange their logical functions"; as Kant explains, "Through the category of substance, […] if I bring the concept of a body under it, it is determined that its empirical intuition in experience must always 20 MAN, AA 04: 475. 21 This view appears to agree with Longuenesses interpretation, according to which, the logical forms of judgment are "the forms of analysis of what is given in sensibility (Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 11). In fact, she also speaks of "the empirical use of logical functions of judgment" (Ibid., 194, and also 27). However, for Longuenesse, there are different stages at which the logical forms function for different purposes, whereas the account given in the present paper focuses merely on the role of the logical forms in combining concepts into a judgment (or the role they play in the first part [or sections 15 to 20] of the B-Deduction). I discuss Longuenesses interpretation below. 22 Longuenesse, Beatrice: Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 71. 23 Prol AA 04: 298. My emphasis.
Seung-Kee Lee be considered as subject, never as mere predicate; and likewise with all the other categories."
24 Moreover, it is only when the logical forms are employed determinately, that is, as categories, that cognition of an object results; the two concepts in the judgment "the stone is hard", for example, are connected not merely in thought but also "in the object": "I represent to myself in the object as determined that the stone in every possible determination of an object, and not of the mere concept, must be thought only as subject and the hardness only as predicate, […]"
25 It follows that when the logical forms are employed merely indeterminately, the concepts are connected only in thought but not "in the object".
Kant contrasts "the logical use of the understanding"
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, in which the logical forms of judgment are employed indeterminately, with "the transcendental use of the power of judgment" 27 , which involves "the sensible condition under which alone pure concepts of the understanding can be employed, i. e., the schematism of the pure understanding". 28 In Reflection 5933 29 Kant also says that "the Schematism shows the condition under which an appearance is determined in respect to a logical function and, therefore, stands under a category". 30 In other words, it is the provision of the schema (or "the transcendental time-determination") that makes possible the determinate as opposed to the indeterminate employment of the logical forms of judgment.
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For Kant, "the act of the understanding" or judging, as it is considered by transcendental logic, is nothing other than the act of determining, that is to say, of delimiting, restricting, or specifying that which general The Subjective Unity of Consciousness in Kant logic leaves indeterminate, namely, the manner in which the concepts in a judgment are to relate to one another, or more specifically, with regard to the categorical form of judgment 32 , which concept is to function as the subject and which concept as the predicate.
II. Logical Forms and Consciousness in the Transcendental Deduction
Before delving into the passages in which the significance of understanding the distinction between the determinate and indeterminate employment of the logical forms of judgment becomes clear, I would like to clarify the status of the categories that the foregoing interpretation supports. I have argued that the logical forms of judgment can be employed either indeterminately or determinately, and that it is only in the latter case that they are employed as categories. This implies that whether the logical forms will be employed as categories or not depends on what Kant calls "the act of the understanding", that is to say, the act of judging. This interpretation differs from the received view regarding the categories. According to this view, the categories exist even before the activity of judging is carried out, so that "the categories are just concepts that make the logically distinct forms and components of judgment applicable to our intuitions", or that "categories are supposed to describe twelve different ways of conceiving of objects that are necessary in order to make the twelve different logical functions of judgment applicable to them".
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Such a view is questioned, however, by Beatrice Longuenesse, whose interpretation seems to agree with the one I am supporting. She notes that: the categories, as full-fledged concepts, […] are in no way prior to the activity of judging. On the contrary, they result from this activity of generating and combining concepts according to the logical forms of judgment.
[…] one should not be misled into supposing that the categories are concepts ready to be applied prior to the activity of judgment. Such an interpretation is incompatible with Kants consistent opposition to innatism of representations. Although Loguenesses interpretation differs from mine in some details (which I note below), 35 both interpretations emphasize the necessity of the activity of judging for the generation of the categories. This idea will be operative in my analysis below of the distinction between subjective and objective unity of consciousness, and the distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of experience.
One of the most intriguing and at the same time controversial views that Kant tries to defend in the Transcendental Deduction sections of the Critique of Pure Reason is that cognition of an object or an objective judgment is impossible without the unity of apperception or of self-consciousness. 36 Since it is in these sections that Kant brings together his theory of judgment and his views on consciousness, 37 it is these sections that I shall focus on in this paper. The sections in question are those in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason that lead to the conclusion which Kant himself identified (at B 159) as the goal of "the transcendental deduction of the categories", that is, section 15 to section 20. These are the sections that many, though not all, commentators (following Dieter Henrichs suggestion) refer to as "step one" of the deduction. 38 What I shall focus on in these passages is the role the difference between the determinate and indeterminate employment of the logical forms of judg-35 In fact, Longuenesses view is complex. She notes that the categories are the logical forms before "synthesis of what is given in sensibility" is carried out, but the logical forms themselves "govern the synthesis" (Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 12). 36 KrV, B 130 -143. I restrict my examination to Kants views elaborated in the Bdeduction, for, as I am mainly concerned with the relation between judgment and consciousness, it is in the B-Deduction (but not in the A-Deduction) that Kant makes explicit the mediating role that judgment plays between the categories and the unity of apperception. There are in fact also passages in the A-Deduction that lend support to my interpretation. For example, at A 106 -107, even though he does not explicitly mention the act of judging, Kant says that "empirical apperception" (as opposed to "transcendental apperception") is only "the determination of our state in internal perception … forever variable". I thank Bryan Hall for pointing this out. 37 Allison (Kants Transcendental Idealism. New Haven 2004, 176) notes that the incorporation of the account of judgment in section 19 of the B-Deduction "constitutes a major improvement over the A-Deduction, which attempted to relate apperception to the categories and the latter to experience without explicitly referring to judgment". 38 "
Step two" consists of section 21 to section 26. The Subjective Unity of Consciousness in Kant ments plays in Kants account of the relation between consciousness and the act of judging. Few recent commentators have discussed this role. This is surprising given that the distinction between the determinate and indeterminate employment of the logical forms of judgment is noted and alluded to by Kant himself throughout the sections that make up the first step of the B-Deduction. In fact, the paragraph that immediately precedes section 15, 39 which is the section that begins the whole of the B-Deduction, is the paragraph that we examined above, namely, the one in which Kant explains the distinction. 40 The significance of this passage, with which Kant prefaces the whole of the B-Deduction, becomes evident once we realize that this explanation is reiterated in section 20, in which the conclusion of the entire first step of the deduction is stated:
That act of the understanding […] through which the manifold of given representations (whether they be intuitions or concepts) is brought under an apperception in general, is the logical function of judgments ( § 19) . Therefore all manifold, insofar as it is given in one empirical intuition, is determined in regard to one of the logical functions for judgment, by means of which, namely, it is brought to a consciousness in general. But now the categories are nothing other than these very functions for judging, insofar as the manifold of a given intuition is determined with regard to them ( § 13).
forms of judgment are employed. But, as we already know from section 14, the same logical forms can also be employed indeterminately, in which case the manifold of representations will be brought, not to "the pure apperception" but to "the empirical apperception" (B 132) . 42 This means that, although in the quoted passage from section 20 all that Kant points out is the fact that the categories are nothing other than the logical forms of judgment as they are employed determinately, as we proceed to examine those sections that precede and lead up to section 20 (namely, sections 15 to 19), it is crucial to keep in mind what he also points out in the quoted passage from section 14, namely, that the same logical forms of judgments, through "the logical use of the understanding", can be employed indeterminately, and that when they are so employed, the representations are connected only "subjectively" or "empirically", i. e., not "in the object" (B 142).
The point that there needs to be a determinate use of the logical forms or a "determinate relation" of representations in order for there to be a cognition of an object is emphasized by Kant throughout the BDeduction sections. To show this, I would now like to run through briefly each of the six sections that make up "step one" of the B-Deduction, namely, sections 15 to 20.
Kant begins the deduction in section 15 by identifying what he calls "combination" as "the action of the understanding", which, in turn, is equated with "synthesis" (B 130). As we find out later in section 19, this act of combining or unifying, or of synthesis, is nothing other than the act of judgment (B 142). And, as we also find out in sections 19 and 20, this act involves the employment of the logical forms of judgment, which, as Kant has already made clear in section 14, can be employed determinately or indeterminately.
In section 16, this act of synthesis is tied to the unity of apperception or of self-consciousness (B 133 -136) . In order for a manifold of representations to be a manifold at all, it must be combined in one consciousness. But in order for a subject to be conscious of its own identity, it must (somehow) be aware of its own act of combining the manifold of representations into a unity (hence, "the synthetic unity of apperception"). Thus, the unity of consciousness is impossible apart from the synthesis 42 Or so I shall argue below, following Jürg Freudigers suggestion. In the Prolegomena Kant distinguishes between "consciousness in general" and "a consciousness of my state" or "a consciousness in one subject only" (Prol AA 04: 304). Cf. KrV, A 106 -107.
The Subjective Unity of Consciousness in Kant of the manifold of representations, and the synthesis of the manifold of representations is impossible apart from the unity of consciousness. Then, in section 17, Kant argues that the synthetic unity of apperception is required for the representation of objects; for, "an object" is possible only when the manifold of intuitions are unified or synthesized under a concept. But since representations can be unified only if they are combined in one consciousness, the unity of apperception is necessary for the representation of objects. Kant then notes that "cognitions" consist in "the determinate relation of given representations to an object" (B137), or that "a determinate combination of the given manifold" is what gives rise to a "cognition of an object" (B 138). Thus a cognition arises not from a mere combination or relation but from a determinate combination or relation of representations; and when we remember what Kant says in section 14 (namely, that the logical forms of judgment can be employed determinately or indeterminately), representations can also be combined indeterminately, the result of which is explained in the next section.
In section 18, Kant distinguishes between a "combination of representations" that is merely "subjective", "empirical", and "contingent, and a combination of representations that is "necessarily and universally valid". This distinction is also linked to the distinction between what Kant calls "subjective" and "objective unity of consciousness", and between "the empirical unity of apperception" and "the objective unity of selfconsciousness" (B139 -140). Kant notes that the empirical unity of apperception "has merely subjective validity" because its unity "depends on the circumstances, or empirical conditions"; and under such conditions "one person combines the representations […] with one thing, another [person] with something else", that is to say, they are not combined determinately. Its unity, therefore, is "not […] necessarily and universally valid" (B 140). 43 Thus, from Kants claim in section 14 that the categories are nothing other than the determinate ways in which the logical forms are employed, it may be inferred that what Kant calls a merely "subjective" and "empirical" connection of representations can be equated with a connection that is not "a determinate relation of representations to an object", that is, a merely indeterminate relation of representations. In section 19, we learn that the act of synthesis by means of which the manifold of representations is united in one consciousness is nothing other than the act of judging. In other words, apart from the activity of judging, no manifold would be unified, and thus no representations would represent anything "for me", and I could not become conscious of my own identity. A "judgment" is defined as "the way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception" (B 141). As Kant tells us, this means that in a judgment (so conceived) the representations are combined "in accordance with principles of the objective determination of all representations insofar as cognition can come from them, […] [my emphasis]" (B142). A judgment, in other words, "is a relation that is objectively valid", which, as Kant emphasizes, is a relation through which "two representations are combined in the object" and not merely in the "subject" (B 142).
And finally in section 20, Kant says that "the act of the understanding" is nothing other than "the logical function of judgments", and that it is through this act that "the manifold of given representations" is ing to which the two kinds of apperception, empirical and pure, underlie two kinds of judgments or two ways of relating representations, one subjective and the other objective; for, Kant seems to be saying that the empirical unity is somehow dependent on or made possible by the transcendental unity of apperception. I make two points in response. First, this claim has been regarded by many commentators as obscure; Kant does not make clear how the one apperception can be "derived from" the other. Allison, for example, in dealing with this difficulty, suggests that the notion of empirical apperception and its subjective unity is not clarified until sections 24 and 26, that is, in "step two" of the BDeduction. However, Allison concludes his discussion of the latter sections by noting that Kants statements therein lead us to an "interpretative dilemma" that "cannot be avoided". Indeed, Allison suggests as one horn of the dilemma that "Kant himself was unclear about both the nature and scope of the argument" (Allison, Kants Transcendental Idealism, New Haven 2004, 183 -185, 198 -201) . The second point is that in spite of its obscurity Kants claim has prompted many commentators to adopt what some have called the "topdown" approach to interpreting Kant, in which one moves from the categories and pure apperception to sensible representations and empirical apperception, an approach that often downplays or even ignores completely those passages in Kants writings that would seem more comprehensible and meaningful when the "bottom-up" approach is adopted instead, such as those passages in sections 18 to 21 of the Prolegomena, which I discuss in detail below. Although some of the difficulties will remain unresolved, by analyzing and examining some of the crucial terms that Kant uses consistently in his writings, I hope to make connections that will shed some light on Kants view of the relation between logical forms and consciousness.
The Subjective Unity of Consciousness in Kant "brought under an apperception in general" (B143). The categories are nothing other than these logical forms of judgment as they are employed in such a way that intuitions are "determined" with respect to them (B 143). Since the categories are nothing other than the ways in which I perform the act of judging, it follows that every manifold of intuition is subject to the categories. 45 Considering the views that are implicit in the arguments of the B-Deduction summarized above, however, a problem arises. Kant appears to be saying that whenever a manifold of representations is unified in one consciousness, there is a relation of representations to an object, or in other words, a cognition of an object. But this cannot be right, since Kant also speaks of a combination of representations that is merely "subjectively valid" and "contingent". Indeed, as we saw above, Kant makes it clear in sections 16, 18, and 19 , that there is a distinction between "pure" and "empirical" apperception, between "subjective" and "objective unity of apperception", and between a "subjectively" and an "objectively valid" relation of representations respectively. As Allison points out, however, although Kant makes clear what "a subjective unity" is not, namely, a unity brought about by the act of objective judging, he does not clarify what "a subjective unity" is. This prompts Allison to bring up what he calls "the problem of subjective unity". 46 I will return to this problem in the next part of the paper where I will also propose a solution. There is another problem, however.
The account of judgment given in the B-Deduction, particularly in section 19, seems to contradict the account of judgment given in the Prolegomena. In section 19, as we recall, a judgment, by definition, is a relation that is "objectively valid". In other words, a relation that is merely subjectively valid cannot be regarded as a judgment at all. In the Prolegomena, however, Kant distinguishes between two kinds of judgment, "a judgment of perception", which is said to be "subjectively valid" because the representations combined in it hold only "for me" but "not for everyone else", and "a judgment of experience", which is said to be "objectively valid" because in it the representations are combined not only "in the subject" but also "in the object" (or they hold not only 45 For a fuller and more detailed exposition, see Allison, Henry: Kants Transcendental Idealism. New Haven 2004, 163 -178. I have relied on Allisons interpretation for many of the points mentioned in the summary. 46 Ibid., 178 f. "for me" but also "for everyone else"). 47 Moreover, Kant says that a judgment of experience is "objectively valid", while a judgment of perception is merely "subjectively valid" because, he maintains, whereas the categories are involved in a judgment of experience, they are not involved in a judgment of perception. 48 Since the sections in the Prolegomena in which the distinction between the two kinds of judgment is elaborated (namely, section 18 to section 21) is supposed to correspond to (and indeed, to represent for Kant a more accessible version of) the transcendental deduction sections in the Critique of Pure Reason (section 15 to section 20), it is natural for the reader to assume that the distinction between the two kinds of judgment introduced in the Prolegomena corresponds to the distinction Kant introduces in the Critique between "subjective" and "objective unity of apperception". But this assumption is called into question by the discrepancy that seems to exist between the two accounts. This apparent discrepancy along with Kants statement that a judgment of perception does not require the categories has led many commentators to question the validity of Kants notion of a judgment of perception.
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Most commentators have dealt with this problem by suggesting that Kant abandoned the account that he gives in the Prolegomena (1783) in favor of the account that he gives in the B-Deduction sections in the Critique of Pure Reason (1787), which, they argue, he introduced to re- place the Prolegomena account. 50 The problem with this suggestion, however, is that it would be plausible only if the distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of experience was never to be found in texts written after 1783. But this is not the case. 51 What is more, a number of recent commentators such as Allison and Longuenesse have tried to show that the two accounts do not contradict one another, that the account in the B-Deduction is consistent with that in the Prolegomena, and that therefore it was not Kants intention to replace the latter account with the former account.
Very few of the commentators, however, have focused on the role the logical forms of judgments play in these works, particularly with respect to the manner in which they are employed in the act of judgment. I shall argue that when Kants distinction between determinate and indeterminate employment of the logical forms of judgment is taken into consideration, a possible way to show the consistency between the two accounts of judgment can be found.
My aim is to show that the distinction between these two ways in which the logical forms of judgment can be employed in the act of judging is connected to the distinction between what Kant describes as a relation of representations that is "subjectively valid" and a relation of representations that is "objectively valid", and between what he calls "subjective" and "objective unity of consciousness" or between "empirical" and "pure apperception". Moreover, textual evidence exists in the Prolegomena that supports the interpretation, according to which, the distinction between a judgment of perception, which is "subjectively valid", and a judgment of experience, which is "objectively valid", is meant to be understood in connection to the distinction between the determinate and indeterminate employment of the logical forms of judgment. If this interpretation can be shown to be correct, we draw closer to understanding how the account of judgment in the Prolegomena and the account of judgment in the Critique of Pure Reason can be seen to be consistent with one another.
In section 18 of the Prolegomena, Kant says that there are two kinds of empirical or synthetic a posteriori judgments: judgments of perception and judgments of experience. As we have already seen, Kant says that judgments of perception are "subjectively valid", while judgments of experience are "objectively valid". In section 20, Kant explains that "a judgment of experience" requires a connection of representations that is based on the "subsumption" of an intuition "under a pure concept of the understanding": "it is requisite that the perception should be subsumed under [a "pure"] concept of the understanding." 52 Kant explains the function of such a concept: it "serves to determine the representation subsumed under it, with respect to judging in general" or it "determines the form of judging in general relatively to the intuition". 53 In section 21a, Kant says that a pure concept of the understanding "can be nothing else than that concept which represents the intuition as determined in itself with regard to one form of judgment rather than another"; it is "a concept of that synthetical unity of intuitions which can only be represented by a given logical function of judgments". 54 In a judgment of experience, therefore, a pure concept of the understanding determines an intuition subsumed under it with regard to one of the logical forms of judgment. In other words, the logical forms of judgment in all judgments of experience are employed determinately, that is to say, so as to refer to an object of intuition.
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A judgment of perception, on the other hand, requires "only the logical connection [der logischen Verknüpfung] of perception in a thinking subject" 56 . In section 21a, Kant says again that a judgment of perception requires, not a pure concept of the understanding, but a mere "sensuous intuition and its logical connection [die logische Verknüpfung] in a judgment" 58 This is understandable given that what Kant seems to be referring to in the passage is a connection that is more than merely "logical" (in the sense of "without content"), and yet at the same time merely subjective and empirical. However, the word "logical" may mean something different here. Jürg Freudiger says, "Kant scheint also davon auszugehen, dass wir beliebige Vorstellun- 60 . If, however, Freudiger and Allisons interpretation is correct, that is to say, if all that Kant means to say in using the phrase a "logical connection of perception" in describing the nature of a judgment of perception is that all such judgments involve the logical forms of judgment, then we are faced with a puzzle. Kants categories are commonly defined as "the logical forms of judgment as applied to intuitions". 61 Indeed, in some passages Kant himself describes the categories in this way. 62 But if this is how we are to understand the nature of the categories and nothing further is said about it, then we are forced to conclude that a judgment of perception, no less than a judgment of experience, involves the categories, since, if a judgment of perception involves the logical forms, then, since such a judgment is synthetic and a posteriori (or empirical), the logical forms involved would have to be applied to intuitions, which is just to say, on the view of the nature of the categories just mentioned, that they are used as categories. But this directly contradicts Kants claim that judgments of perception do not require the categories.
Faced with such difficulties, commentators have responded in a number of ways. Allison, for example, suggests that Kants real position is that the categories do, in fact, govern judgments of perception as well as judgments of experience. For example, after stating that judgments of perception involve the logical forms of judgment, Allison remarks that "the change from a judgment of perception to a judgment of experience does not involve a change in logical form" 63 . But, as has just been noted, if Allison is right, then we are forced to conclude that the categories are involved not only in judgments of experience but also in judgments of perception. But why, then, does Kant say in the Prolegomena that judgments of perception do not involve the categories?
In response to this question, Allison suggests that in the Prolegomena Kant neglected to point out the fact that judgments of perception, no less than judgments of experience, are governed by the categories, because of 64 This is not, however, in my view, entirely convincing, since it fails to explain why, then, Kant apparently goes out of his way in the Prolegomena to point out that judgments of perception do not involve the categories, and that they are "subjectively valid" and not "objectively valid" because the representations combined in them are not "subsumed under" the pure concepts of the understanding. If Kant intentionally wanted to shy away from mentioning (for reasons methodological 65 or otherwise) that the categories are also involved in judgments of perception, then he probably would have refrained from stating, as he does so bluntly and more than a few times, that such judgments do not require the categories.
Jürg Freudiger offers another interpretation. He maintains as Allison does that the logical forms of judgment are involved in both judgments of perception and judgments of experience. As was noted above, however, this brings up the difficulty that both kinds of judgments must then be considered as involving the categories, which Kant explicitly denies. As Freudiger explains the difficulty, "Nun droht der Einwand, dass Wahrnehmungsurteile qua urteile auch dann gemäss der Urteilstafel verknüpft werden müssen, wenn sie nicht objektiv sind, und dass sie daher die Kategorien voraussetzten. Widerlegt dies die Mçglichkeit der Wahrnehmungsurteile?" 66 To solve this difficulty, Freudiger argues that whereas judgments of experience involve the "schematized" categories, judgments of perception involve only the "unschematized" categories. So, according to Freudiger, when Kant says that only a "logical connection of perception" is required for a judgment of perception, or that a pure concept of the understanding is not required for a judgment of perception, Kant means that "das Wahrnehmungsurteil setzt keinen schematisierten Ver- standesbegriff voraus". 67 In order to support his interpretation, Freudiger argues that there are no fewer than three ways in which the categories can be applied in judging, and that while all three ways are involved in judgments of experience, only two are involved in judgments of perception. The first way is as "Urteil überhaupt", the second way consists in "die eigentliche Anwendung der schematisierten Kategorie", and the third way is as the condition of the "Synthesis der Apprehension", which "Wahrnehmung […] voraussetzt" 68 . The third way, according to Freudiger, is elaborated by Kant only in the Analytic of Principles sections in the Critique of Pure Reason. While Freudigers interpretation is interesting, his claim that the categories can be applied in three different ways in judging would raise some questions and perhaps even doubts. His view, however, that judgments of perception involve unschematized categories is suggestive (and it also enables him to come up with a solution to the difficulty in question), and I would like to return to it later on.
Beatrice Longuenesse proposes an interpretation that is not dissimilar to Freudigers. According to Longuenesse, the logical forms of judgment are operative in both a judgment of experience and a judgment of perception, but because the latter involves what she calls "the empirical use of the logical functions of judgment", such a judgment does not "entitle us to consider" the representations connected therein as "subsumable under the corresponding categories" 69 . Thus, Longuenesse maintains that Kant "distinguishes the logical connection [of perception]" which is involved in a judgment of perception, from "the full-fledged application of the category", which is involved in a judgment of experience. 70 In fact, Longuenesse proposes an interpretation of Kants account of judgment that is similar to the one that I have given above. She notes that, for Kant, not every judgment requires the use or the "application" of the categories, "even when judgments […] apply to objects of a sensible intuition"
71
. To illustrate her point, she refers to the paragraph in section 14 of the Critique of Pure Reason (B 128) that I discussed above, the paragraph in which Kant distinguishes between the determinate and indeterminate employment of the logical forms of judgment. Having quoted the passage, Longuenesse comments, "To be sure, this text is not easy to in- terpret. But at least it unambiguously shows that the relation of subject and predicate in a judgment does not always express one of substance and accident. The same holds for all other categories. I will develop this point in detail in part III."
72 Longuenesse discusses the passage in the context of defending Kants metaphysical deduction of the categories against the criticisms raised against it by such authors as Jonathan Bennett and Paul Guyer. But she discusses the passage mainly in connection to the second part or "step two of the B-deduction, particularly section 26, as well as the Schematism chapters, and the Analytic of Principles. She thus misses the opportunity to discuss the passage in connection to the first part of the B-deduction, namely, sections 15 to 20, in which Kant explains the role of judgment and how it relates to the unity of consciousness.
Thus, although she does speak of "a merely logical standpoint" in addressing Kants reference in B 128 to "the merely logical use of the understanding", the distinction between the two ways of employing the logical forms of judgment is not thematized by Longuenesse. In fact, even though she devotes the whole first chapter of her book to elaborating what Kant calls "the logical use of the understanding" in the Inaugural Dissertation (1770), she does not provide as detailed an account of the same term "the logical use of the understanding" as it is used by Kant in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (1787). So, for example, Longuenesse says that "the logical use of the understanding" in the Inaugural Dissertation signifies that use of the understanding by virtue of which mere "appearances" (apparentia) are turned into "experience" or "phenomena" (phaenomena). Longuenesse then argues that this distinction between mere "appearances" and "experience" corresponds to the distinction that Kant later makes in section 14 of the Critique of Pure Reason between object as "appearance" (or as "the indeterminate object of an empirical intuition") and object "as an object", i. e., object as "corresponding to intuition". Thus, according to Longuenesse, the term "the logical use of the understanding" as it is used by Kant in the Inaugural Dissertation denotes the understandings use "in the empirical generalization of our sensible representations" or "the subordination of sensible representations under common concepts". 73 What Longuenesse does not emphasize, however, is the fact that in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, and in the very section that Longuenesses men-72 Ibid., 79, n. 13. 73 Ibid., 26
The Subjective Unity of Consciousness in Kant tions, namely, section 14, Kant says, "in regard to the merely logical use of the understanding, it would remain undetermined which of these two concepts will be given the function of the subject and which will be given that of the predicate [my emphasis]" (B 128). In other words, in this passage, Kant defines "the logical use of the understanding" as that use of the understanding in which the logical forms of judgment are employed indeterminately.
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In sum, Allison, Freudiger, and Longuenesse all construe (correctly, I believe) Kants statement that a judgment of perception requires only "the logical connection of perception" as the claim that the logical forms of judgment are involved in all judgments of perception. What they do not seem to recognize, however, is that the phrase "logical connection" can best be comprehended if it is understood in connection to what Kant calls in section 14 of the Critique of Pure Reason "the logical use of the understanding", which Kant takes to involve the indeterminate employment of the logical forms of judgment, that is to say, the logical forms of judgment as they are employed in such a way that "it would remain undetermined which of [the] two concepts [in a judgment] will be given the function of the subject and which will be given that of the predicate".
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This interpretation avoids the difficulty mentioned above. It is true that the logical forms of judgments are involved in both judgments of perception and judgments of experience. On this interpretation, however, this fact does not give rise to the difficulty in question, namely, that the categories would then be involved in both kinds of judgments (which Kant denies) because the way in which the logical forms of judgments are employed in the two kinds of judgment are not the same: in judgments of perception, the logical forms are employed indeterminately (involving a mere "logical connection of perception"), while in a judgment of experience they are employed determinately, i. e., as categories. In other words, in judgments of perception the logical forms of judgment are employed but indeterminately. This also means that what makes a judgment of perception "subjectively valid", or in other words, what makes "the connection of perception" in such a judgment to be valid only "in a consciousness of my state, without reference to the object" 76 , is the indeterminate (as opposed to the determinate) manner in which the logical forms of judgment are employed. That a judgment of perception involves an indeterminate employment, while a judgment of experience involves a determinate employment of the logical forms of judgment is confirmed in two passages, one in the Prolegomena and the other in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. In these passages, Kant uses the hypothetical form of judgment as an example, while in the passages we examined above he uses the categorical form of judgment as an example. In his discussion of the concept of cause in section 29 of the Prolegomena, Kant writes:
We are first given a priori, by means of logic, the form of a conditional judgment in general; that is, we have one cognition given as antecedent and another as consequent. But it is possible that in perception we may meet with a rule of relation which runs thus: that a certain appearance is constantly followed by another (though not conversely); and this is a case for me to use the hypothetical judgment and, for instance, to say if the sun shines long enough upon a body it grows warm. Here there is indeed as yet no necessity of connection or concept of cause. But I proceed and say that, if this proposition, which is merely a subjective connection of perceptions, is to be a proposition of experience, it must be seen as necessary and universally valid. Such a proposition would be that the sun by its light is the cause of heat.
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Kant makes it clear in this passage that the logical form of judgmenthere, the hypothetical form -is involved in a judgment of perception as well as in a judgment of experience. The way in which it functions in each of the two kinds of judgment, however, is different; in judgments of perception, the hypothetical form is employed so as to make possible a "subjective connection of perceptions," whereas in judgments of experience, it is employed so as to make this connection "necessary and universally valid." In the Second Analogy of the Analytic of Principles of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant specifies more precisely in what this difference consists. In the following passage, Kant explains that the hypothetic form of judgment can be employed either indeterminately or determinately:
Now connection is not the work of mere sense and intuition, but is here rather the product of a synthetic faculty of the imagination, which determines inner sense with regard to temporal relations. This, however, can combine the two states in question in two different ways, so that either 77 Prol 04: 311 f.
The Subjective Unity of Consciousness in Kant one or the other precedes in time; for time cannot be perceived in itself, nor can what precedes and what follows in objects be as it were empirically determined in relation to it. I am therefore only conscious that my imagination places one state before and the other after, not that the one state precedes the other in the object; or, in other words, through the mere perception the objective relation of the appearances that are succeeding one another remains undetermined [my emphasis]. Now in order for this to be cognized as determined [my emphasis] the relation between the two states must be thought in such a way that it is thereby necessarily determined which of them must be placed before and which after rather than vice versa [my emphasis]. The concept, however, that carries a necessity of synthetic unity with it can only be a pure concept of the understanding, which does not lie in the perception, and that is here the concept of the relation of cause and effect, […] 78
In this passage we learn that the hypothetical as well as the categorical form of judgment can be employed in two ways: in a judgment of perception the hypothetical form is employed so as to leave "undetermined" which of the two states is to "precede" and which is to "follow" the other; while in a judgment of experience the hypothetical form is employed so as to determine "which [state] must be placed before and which after rather than vice versa," or which "state preceded the other in the object" (B 233 -34) . And this is why a judgment of perception merely "expresses a relation of two sensations to the same subject, that is, myself, and that only in my present state of perception"
79
. A judgment of experience, on the other hand, in which the hypothetical form is employed determinately, i. e., as the category of cause, expresses this relation objectively or as determined "in the object."
When the quoted passage from the Critique of Pure Reason is read side by side with the quoted passage from the Prolegomena, it becomes clear that the distinction Kant makes in the latter between "a subjective connection of perceptions" and a connection that is "objectively valid" or "necessarily and universally valid" 80 is meant to be understood in connection with the distinction Kant makes in the former between "indeterminate" and "determinate" employment of the logical forms of judgment. In other words, we now have textual support for the crucial link that we assumed above that Kant makes. For Kant, the distinction between the determinate and indeterminate employment of the logical forms of judgment underlies the distinction between a judgment of perception 78 KrV, and a judgment of experience. But we also know that for Kant a judgment of perception is "subjectively valid" because in such a judgment the connection of representations, as merely "empirical" and "contingent", is valid for "a consciousness in one subject only", 81 while a judgment of experience is "objectively valid" because in such a judgment the connection of representations, as "necessary and universal", is valid for "a consciousness in general". 82 Thus, from these connections it can now safely be inferred that the distinction between the determinate and indeterminate employment of the logical forms of judgment is also meant to be understood in connection to the distinction between what Kant refers to as "a connection" of representations that is "subjectively valid" and a connection of representations that is "objectively valid". Indeed, these distinctions help us to comprehend the distinction between a judgment of perception and a judgment of experience in a way that makes it possible to show the consistency between the account of judgment given in the Prolegomena and the account of judgment given in section 19 of the Critique of Pure Reason, to which I now turn.
In this section, Kant defines a judgment as "a relation that is objectively valid".
83 While one might so construe this definition as to rule out any possibility that there could be such a thing as "a judgment of perception", which, Kant says, is "subjectively valid", once we take into consideration the distinctions we established above and the fact that these distinctions are elaborated by Kant and play a significant role not only in section 19 but throughout the sections that make up the first part of the B-Deduction (sections 15 to 20), it no longer becomes implausible to hold the two accounts of judgment to be consistent with one another. For example, in section 19, Kant also defines a judgment as "the way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception". 84 But Kant contrasts what he calls here "the objective unity of apperception" with what he calls "a subjective unity of apperception" in section 18.
85 "The subjective unity of apperception", in turn, corresponds to what Kant calls "the empirical unity of apperception", which is said to "have only subjective validity". Given all this, and given also that in section 19 Kant provides an example of both a relation of representations that is merely "subjective valid"-"If I carry a body, I feel a pressure of weight"-and a relation of representations that is "objectively valid"-"It, the body, is heavy"-and given that these two judgments are strikingly similar to the examples of the two kinds of judgment that Kant gives in the Prolegomena-"if the sun shines on the stone, it grows warm" is the example of a judgment of perception, and "the sun warms the stone" is the example of a judgment of experience-the fact that Kant does not actually use the phrase "a judgment of perception" in section 19 may not be as significant as the fact that the kind of relation of representations that such a judgment is said to represent in the Prolegomena, namely, a relation that is "subjectively valid", "empirical", and "contingent", is precisely what Kant describes in section 19 of the B-Deduction in order to distinguish it from a relation that is "objectively valid". Freudiger is, therefore, justified in concluding that, if Kant wants to define a judgment that is "objectively valid" as "nothing other than the way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception", as he does in section 19, 87 then "wir koennten daher in Analogie zum […] zitierten Satz aus B 141 nun sagen: ein Wahrnehmungsurteil ist nichts anderes als die Art, gegebene Wahrnehmungen zur subjektiven Einheit der Apperzeption zu bringen." 88 Thus, the fact that Kant did not actually use the term "a judgment of perception" in section 19 to describe the kind of relation involved therein may not be as detrimental to Kants account as some commentators have thought. Now, we have already seen that, according to Freudigers interpretation, the difference between the two kinds of judgment that Kant distinguishes in both the Prolegomena and the B-Deduction in the Critique of Pure Reason, namely, between a "subjectively valid" and an "objectively valid" judgment, consists in the fact that whereas the "subjectively valid" judgment (the judgment of perception in the Prolegomena) involves unschematized categories, the "objectively valid" judgment (the judgment of experience in the Prolegomena) involves the schematized categories. On Freudigers interpretation, then, it is because the unschematized categories are not full-fledged categories that Kant says in the Prolegomena that a judgment of perception "does not require a pure concept of the understanding"; in fact, "die Bemerkung, dass das Wahrnehmungsurteil nur 87 KrV, B 141. 88 Freudiger, Jürg: "Zum Problem der Wahrnehmungsurteile," 427 f. subjektiv gültig (Prol. 298) sei, ist gleichbedeutend mit: die Wahrnehmungsurteile bedürfen keines reinen Verstandesbegriffs (ebd.)."
89 As we have already seen, Kant says that "the sensible condition under which alone pure concepts of the understanding can be employed" is the "schematism of the pure understanding". 90 This seems to confirm Freudigers interpretation, according to which, a judgment in which the pure concept of the understanding is not required is a judgment that involves, not the schematized, but the "unschematized" categories.
What Freudiger does not seem to recognize, however, is that, for Kant, the provision of the schema (or "the transcendental time-determination") makes possible not merely the use of "a pure concept of the understanding" understood in the sense of "schematized categories", but more specifically, a determinate as opposed to merely indeterminate employment of the logical forms of judgment. In the Critique of Pure Reason, for example, Kant says that "the actions of the understanding [i.e., judgments], […] apart from the schemata of sensibility, are undetermined […]". 91 Moreover, in Reflection 5933, 92 Kant says, "the Schematism shows the condition under which an appearance is determined in respect to a logical function and, therefore, stands under a category". 93 Thus, for example, Freudiger notes that there are three ways in which the categories can be involved in a judgment, and that in a judgment of perception only two of the three ways are involved (whereas all three ways are involved in a judgment of experience), namely, their function as "judgment in general" and as "the condition of the synthesis of apprehension", which is described in the Analytic of Principles. The third function, namely, as the schematized categories, is not involved in such judgments.
Apart from the difficulty of comprehending how there could be three ways in which the categories can function in judging, what Freudiger leaves out in his account is the fact that the logical forms of judgment, which are involved in all judgments without exception, can be employed either determinately or indeterminately, and that the application of the categories, for Kant, is equivalent to the determinate employment of the logical forms of judgment. As the quoted passages indicate, it is the The Subjective Unity of Consciousness in Kant difference between these two ways of employing the logical forms that Kant is concerned with in his account of the schema, which, he says, alone makes possible a determinate (as opposed to a merely indeterminate) employment of the logical forms. Beatrice Longuenesse proposes another way to reconcile the account of judgment given in the Prolegomena with the account of judgment given in section 19 of the Critique of Pure Reason. She argues that whereas in the Prolegomena Kant opposes "two types of empirical judgments", in the Critique of Pure Reason he opposes "two origins of judgment" 94 . Thus, "the Critique and the Prolegomena obey a different purpose"; she explains:
In the Prolegomena, Kant distinguishes between two types of empirical judgments. In the Critique, he shows what the combinations of our perceptions would be in the absence of a function of judging that we could consider as original, what they would be if our judgments merely derived from empirical associations. Then our representations would have no other connection than those derived from subjective associations, and the only adequate formulation for these combinations would be such as if I carry a body, I feel [a pressure of weight]. No combination would be adequately expressed by it, the body, is heavy, since no combination would hold whatever the state of the subject, that is, as a judgment of experience.
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In other words, as Longuenesse sees it, in section 19 of the Critique, Kant is rejecting "Humean associationism". 96 In her view, Kant is not explaining in this section the difference between two kinds of empirical judgments, as he does in the Prolegomena, but rather, he is arguing that, if the only way in which we could combine sensible representations were through the associative (Humean) act of the imagination, no judgment, in the Kantian sense, that is, in the sense of "expressing relation to an object" 97 , could ever arise. Instead, all combinations would be "subjectively valid", resulting in skepticism. 98 In the Prolegomena, on the other hand, Kant is distinguishing between two kinds of judgments, both of which involve the logical forms of judgments, and, therefore, both of which express "a relation to an object even if this form is filled in an empirical, contingent, and (empirically) subjective manner [in a judgment of percep-94 Longuenesse, Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 188. 95 Ibid., 187 f. 96 Ibid., 186. 97 Ibid., 185. 98 Ibid., 187. acterization with the example of an "objectively valid" relation of representations that Kant gives in section 19 of the Critique, viz., "it, the body, is heavy", in which, he says, "the two representations are combined in the object, i. e., regardless of any difference in the conditions of the subject, and are not merely found together in perception […]"
112 On this interpretation, we are not forced to deny what seems obvious since both examples, viz., "if I carry a body, I feel a pressure of weight" (in the Critique) and "if the sun shines on the stone, it grows warm" (in the Prolegomena), can be regarded as instances of what Kant calls "subjectively valid" relations of representations that can, moreover, be regarded as judgments insofar as they both involve the logical forms judgment as they are employed indeterminately, that is to say, as they are employed in such a way that the representations are connected, as Kant notes, only in the subject, though not "in the object".
III. The Subjective Unity of Consciousness
If the foregoing interpretation is correct, we can conclude that what Kant calls "the subjective unity" or "the empirical unity" of consciousness or "empirical apperception" refers to that "unity" which results from the indeterminate way in which representations have been combined, that is, in such a way that the manner in which the concepts are to relate to one another in the judgment has not been fixed or determined in ones consciousness. In other words, for Kant, the representations being combined or unified "subjectively", "contingently", and "empirically" is equivalent to their being related to one another in accordance with the merely "logical use of the understanding", that is, in accordance with an indeterminate employment of the logical forms. Unfortunately, Kant does not make clear precisely how the kind of (self-) awareness that is involved when the representations are combined merely subjectively or "only in the consciousness of my state" differs from the kind of (self-) awareness that is involved when the representations are combined not only in the subject but also "in the object". For example, Kant, as we saw, argues in the Transcendental Deduction that self-consciousness is required for cognition or objective judgment. Kant seems to be saying that we can be conscious of our activity of combining or be conscious of the ways in which the representations are being combined. But how are we to un-derstand such a claim? Moreover, what is the nature of the state of our consciousness when the representations are unified according to an indeterminate use of the logical forms, i. e., in such a way that "it is undetermined which concept is to function as subject and which concept as predicate"? As we have already seen, Kant does not explain how the "subjective unity" differs from the "objective unity" of consciousness, and, in fact, his account seems to suggest (to our puzzlement) that any unification of representations that is effected in one consciousness is an "objective unity". It can perhaps be suggested that, for Kant, even a relation of representations brought about by, say, a mere associative (Humean) act of the imagination constitutes a "unity", since what he calls "the unity of consciousness" or "the unity of apperception", whether it be objective or subjective, is impossible apart from the combining or synthetic activity that is always carried out in accordance with the logical forms of judgments. But such a suggestion still leaves us with some unanswered questions.
A few recent scholars have dealt with the question of the relation between apperception or self-consciousness and the act of judging in Kants theoretical philosophy. Patricia Kitcher, for example, does discuss apperception as it relates to judging, 113 but she does not take into consideration the role of the logical forms of judgment and the categories in her discussion.
114 Henry Allison also offers an account of the relation between consciousness and the act of judging, but like Kitcher, he does not bring to bear the role the logical forms and the categories play in this relation. Nonetheless, I would like to examine Allisons account since it does make reference to the notion of indeterminacy and since, if developed further, it can help bring out another dimension in our comprehension of this relation.
Allison says that Kants "conception of knowledge" commits him to two views: one, "that judgment involves a synthesizing, unifying activity, exercised upon the given by the understanding", and two, "that it involves 113 Kitcher, Patricia: Kants Transcendental Psychology, 104 -115. 114 Kitcher says, " [Kant] believes that the unity of apperception is brought about by syntheses that are guided by rules associated with the categories. I omit this aspect, because it does not bear on the soundness of the reply to Hume [which is her focus in the chapter] and because I do not believe that the arguments for categorically determined syntheses succeed" (Ibid., 105). a consciousness of this activity". 115 He suggests that judgment be construed as "the activity of taking as". He explains:
To judge is to take something as a such and such. In the simplest case, an indeterminate something x is taken as an F. In more complex cases, Fx is qualified by further "determinations"; for example, Fx is G (this cat is black). […] in all these cases the mind must not only combine the items (representations or judgments) in a single consciousness, it must also be conscious of what it is doing. […] unless one is aware of taking x as an F (recognizing it in a concept), one has not in fact taken it as such.
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Allison says that this "taking" is "a spontaneous, inherently self-conscious activity of the subject".
117 He also characterizes this act of "taking as" as "recognition", that is, being "aware of taking x as an F" in a categorical judgment or "the grasping of reasons as reasons" in reasoning or inference.
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Allisons account is highly suggestive. He specifies what it is that the subject must be conscious of in the act of judging that leads to knowledge and thus explains why Kant says that such judgments must involve selfconsciousness. What Allison does not incorporate in his discussion, however, is the role the logical forms of judgment plays in ones consciousness of the act of judging. This is unfortunate given that Allison himself describes this act of judging, which he equates with the act of "taking as", as the act of determining, that is, in Allisons words, the act of taking "an indeterminate something" as a such and such. 119 In another essay, for example, Allison says that "to judge is just to take some intuitively given item or set thereof as a determinate something. [For example,] an indeterminate something = x is taken as an F. Apart from or prior to this conceptual determination, there is no content for thought." 120 I have shown above that, for Kant, cognition of an object or objective judgment (as opposed to a mere relation of representations that does not refer to an object) requires the determinate employment of the logical forms. In other words, nothing can be grasped as an object unless the logical The Subjective Unity of Consciousness in Kant forms are employed in such a way that the merely logical function that orders the representations is fixed or specified in some way. The same point can be made from the perspective of apperception. The possibility of the unity of consciousness or apperception must be construed in terms of the manner in which the logical forms are employed in the act of judging. Kant explains the state of consciousness in human cognition, whether it is merely "subjective" or "objective" (that is, whether the representations are unified for one subject only or for all), in terms of whether or not the subject succeeds, through the activity of judging, in fixing, delimiting, or determining, the content of thought. In other words, for Kant, cognition and thus the objective unity of consciousness is impossible apart from the act of making a particular or specific use of the general forms of thinking that are available to human understanding. Given all this, Allisons account seems to give rise to the following problem. According to this account, the act of judging is equivalent to the act of "taking as", which he construes as the act of determining that which was formerly "an indeterminate something". Such an account, however, will not be able to distinguish adequately the act of "taking as" that represents a determinate, objective judgment from the act of "taking as" that amounts to a merely indeterminate, subjective judgment. For example, a judgment that results from a mere Humean, associative act of the imagination may take the form of "taking" some item in experience "as a such and such". But this obviously would not count as an objective judgment. So the problem is that as it stands it seems that Allisons account of judging as the act of "taking as" cannot explain how an indeterminate, subjective judgment differs from a determinate, objective judgment. In other words, what Allisons account has to (but cannot) rule out is the possibility that the act of "taking as", understood as the act of determining, be involved in subjective judgments.
Allison would reply that a Humean association is not a judgment at all, and therefore, is not an instance of the act of "taking as". But, as we have already seen, for Kant, even a relation of representations that does not refer to an object (including Humean associations as well as various species of what he calls "judgments of perception") employs the logical forms, though indeterminately and not determinately. In other words, Kant allows for subjective judgments, in which (as we saw) the "unity" of consciousness is said by Kant to be merely "subjective" or "empirical" since, again, the logical forms employed therein are not fixed or determined for cognition of an object. In this connection, Longuenesse points out, I believe correctly, that even those judgments that have the catego-rical form (S is P) can result from a mere associative act of the imagination:
The subjective unity ["of given representations"] emerges from the associative combinations of imagination, which are dependent on the contingent conjunctions of our representations.
[…] For example, a judgment such as Bodies are heavy may be only the empirical generalization of a customary association between impressions of weight and of carrying a body. If it expresses nothing more than such a generalization, the correlation it expresses is contingent.
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If my analysis is correct, one way in which Allisons account can be supplemented is to provide an explanation as to how the kind of "taking as" involved in a subjective judgment differs from the kind of "taking as" involved in an objective judgment.
An account that includes such an explanation can be developed if Allisons account is construed in the context of what I have shown above. For Kant, there could simply be no act of "taking as", if this act is construed (as it is by Allison) as the act of determining, unless the logical forms are employed determinately. The same point can be made in the following way from the standpoint of apperception: Allison says that the act of "taking as" involves at the same time a consciousness of this activity. But if this activity is understood (as it is by Allison) as one of determining that which was at first indeterminate, then the unity of consciousness involved in such an activity is objective, not subjective; and if so, this activity can take place only when the logical forms are employed determinately. Kant makes it clear that what he calls "determinations" (Bestimmungen) are not mere attributes, but "real predicates" (as opposed to merely "logical predicates") or representations that refer to an object. 122 It is only in the Transcendental Deduction sections in the Critique of Pure Reason that the explanation is given of how such representations are possible at all. I have shown above that in these sections we 121 Longuenesse, Beatrice: Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 83. Of course, if this judgment emerges from "the objective unity of given representations", then it is objectively valid, as Kant notes in section 19 of the Critique of Pure Reason.
Another example of an empirical judgment that could be either subjectively valid or objectively valid is the one given in the passage from MAN discussed above: "the stone is hard" (MAN AA 04: 475). Longuenesse discusses another example of such judgments that Kant gives in the Prolegomena, "air is elastic". See Longuenesse, Beatrice: Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 84. 122 KrV, A 598/B 626
The Subjective Unity of Consciousness in Kant cause it can be represented as a specific instance of a more general concept (body), which in turn may be "brought under" a still more general concept, and so on, though in the end the most general concept would be the category. This interpretation is supported by a number of passages, such as the following passage in the Critique of Pure Reason in which Kant mentions the condition that must be met if objectively valid empirical judgments are to be possible:
[Empirical laws] are only particular determinations of yet higher laws, the highest of which (under which all others stand) come from the understanding itself a priori, and […] must provide the appearances with their lawfulness and by that very means make experience possible.
124
As Michael Friedman comments, "Only such […] [a] procedure, in which empirical laws are successively determined by synthetic a priori principles of the understanding, can explain how a judgment of perception can be converted into a judgment of experience."
125 Every act of judging, then, involves taking something as a determinate or specific representation of a more general one. For Kant, cognition of an object is impossible apart from such an act of determining. So what we must be conscious of in the act of judging that leads to cognition of an object is the act of determining, which should be understood not merely as the act of ascribing properties or "determinations" to "an indeterminate something", but more fundamentally, as the act of grasping or taking something as a specific instance of a more general representation, which, after all, is (as I have shown) how Kant himself understands "the act of determining", and thus of the act of judging itself.
But what does it mean to say that the act of judging objectively is equivalent to the act of determining in which I am conscious of the act of grasping something as a specific instance of a more general representation? Wouldnt this mean that only logicians and philosophers can hope to make objective judgments? To avoid this absurdity, it may be suggested that the awareness need not be explicit. Implicit awareness, recognition in retrospect ("after the fact"), or even awareness as a "second order" act suffices. Thus, what is required is the capacity of the subject to be conscious of the act of grasping such a relation. The Subjective Unity of Consciousness in Kant
